SIRE inspection observations during the 4th Quarter 2016

Avoidable Observations in SIRE inspection received during the 4th Quarter 2016

Chapter 2

• Engine room had been fitted with Sewage holding tank, capacity 25.21 cubic meters. However, this was not recorded in International Sewage Pollution Prevention Certificate.

• The Safety Equipment Form E did not state that the "back up arrangement for electronic nautical publications" was provided. However, the Tide tables and IAMSAR Vol. III was only electronic copy onboard with USB memory and, the IAMSAR Vol. III USB memory checked and found no information inside or could not readable during inspection period. (Last hard copy of IAMSAR Vol. III version 2013 onboard.)

• CAP survey was carried out during the last dry dock as reported however report was not available on board.

• Emergency procedures had not been written specifically for gas carriers, especially concerning fire and explosion and release of vapours.

• The class survey status report and class survey record were not available at the time of the inspection.

Chapter 3

• The online matrix indicated the master had been in rank for 1.4 years but his actual sea time in rank was 8.5 months including present service time.

• 2nd officers bridge team management certificate was not available on board.

• Officers matrix posted on the SIRE Web site did not reflect the information of the officers on board at the time of the inspection. Chief Officer, Chief Engineer and the 3rd engineer had valid application forms issued by The Panama Maritime Authority but they had not received their flag certificate of competency to date.

• During the previous month of October, the Chief Engineer had three consecutive periods of 24 hours without taken AT LEAST the recommended 6 hour of continuous rest.

• Engine room had been fitted with Sewage holding tank, capacity 25.21 cubic meters. However, this was not recorded in International Sewage Pollution Prevention Certificate.

• A perusal of rest hour records for the month indicated that the Chief Officer (7 days) and AB2 (4 days) had nonconformities for 3 and more days. However, there was evidence that managers were informed about these non-compliances.

Chapter 4

• It was observed that 20 m contour was marked as no go area instead of 10 m contour, vessel max draft + squat+ UKC was 8.7 m during entrance of present port approach.

• A bubble of approximately 10 mm diameter was observed in the magnetic compass.

• A random perusal of the voyage charts observed that in force Temp notices were not plotted on voyage charts BA 38, 39, 682, 699 and 707. Paper charts were the primary means of navigation.

• NP 232 and BPG 2016 edition were not available on board.

• Charts of the ECDIS were not marked with markings like No Go Areas, Parallel indexing, Prominent navigation and radar marks etc.

• The E.M log appears to be erratic with readings fluctuating between + 1.0 Kts and 4.5 Kts at the berth.

• There was no evidence that application of CATZOC while calculating ECDIS safety depth settings had been considered in the voyage plan effected.

• Two sets of ECDISs were used as means of navigation, but they were not incorporated into pilot master information exchange card the section with regard to equipment check and ready for use.

Chapter 5

• Recent Enclosed Space Entry Permits stated that 3rd Officer on the bridge at sea was the Responsible Officer, which was not a safe practice, especially as he could not see many of the entry points from the bridge, and was likely busy navigating.

• It was observed that enclosed space entry permits were not filled correctly. For recent inspections of ballast tanks the C/E was recorded as the responsible person attending while the C/Off went down. The C/E was not involved in the entry.

• Safety equipment store, which is located main deck starboard aft side, was not provided with emergency light.

• Radiation reflecting silver lining of the firemens outfit set located in steering gear room was found partly faded (Approximately 50% of the lining).

• Port side ER vent fan flap manually operated, but the wire approximately 5 mm in diameter to open and shut the flap noticed with many layers on the small drum and not properly reeled on it. The wire was observed tangled up on the drum. This observation was corrected before The Vetting Inspector left the vessel.

• Vessels portable gangway (stowed at the subject berth) had not been marked with maximum/minimum angles of inclination.

• Records of latest lifeboat launching showed it was not part of an abandon ship drill as required by SOLAS, and did not include procedures in line with MSC.1/Circ.1206, such as lowering and raising boats before boarding, and lifeboat launching procedures in SMS were also not in line with MSC.1/Circ.1206, having last been updated in 2009. Crew had not boarded by ladder, as instructed by SMS, and instructions to test on load release by sharp stop was not a safe procedure.

• It was observed that the lowest step of starboard pilot ladder was broken with about 5 cm crack.

• The cargo vent masts were provided with N2 bottles at local site and, with the use of regulators, this was intended to be used for fire extinguishing. There were no specific instructions posted regarding the operational use. (This was seen rectified at the time of disembarkation).

• Galley exhaust duct CO2 extinguishing system: Although the fire damper at the bottom of galley exhaust duct was activating by fusible plug, the manual shutting of damper was not practical as the valve was not easily accessible (in case of fire at upper part of the trunk).

Chapter 6

• Locking teeth arrangement on two of the flap type manifold amp; isolating valves fitted on the FO and DO bunker lines on port and stbd sides at the break of accommodation were frozen/worn out which would allow slam shut of the valve during operation.

• It was observed that the drain lines of HFO / MDO bunker manifolds located at aft end of main deck (port and starboard) was not plugged at the time of inspection. The drain lines were fitted with double valves. The drain lines were plugged once the inspector pointed it out.

• Sampling arrangement fitted with the air pipes for ballast tanks had 08 nut/bolts to open to sample water from the ballast tanks.

• Drainage channels for steering gear save all were blocked by wooden flooring on one side and wooden pallet on the other.

• The drain plug for save all of emergency generator fuel oil tank vent head was not firmly plugged during inspection, also the capacity of save all was not clearly marked.

• The operators Ballast Management Plan not contained procedures for the disposal of sediments and no any records such as operations onboard.

Chapter 7

• Hold space and void space inspection records were incorrectly maintained. For these spaces the item about gauging system and anode wastage was marked even though there were no anodes or gauging system at these locations.

Chapter 8

• Portable drip tray provided for cargo manifold did not indicate lowest temperature it can withstand and relevant certification was not available onboard (Cargo manifolds designed for 48 degrees centigrade were not provided with fixed drip tray arrangement).

• Liquid line relief valves near the flying bridge were poorly maintained and one for the Number 1 tank appeared to be not holding. Cargo was passing through and the line across was cold.

• There was a single common vent fan for the Bow thruster space and Motor room. The vessel did not have a spare motor or rotor for the same.

• Inert gas fan number 2 discharge outlet pressure gauge indicating needle found broken.

• The temperature indicating devices at the manifolds were not marked with the lowest temperature for which the cargo tank has been approved for. (This was seen rectified at the time of disembarkation).

• Hose handling crane hook safety latch was missing.

• While all fitted lights working, portable torch was needed to inspect the compressor room equipment and compressor gauges. Lighting in the compressor room was not deemed satisfactory.

• Loading computer was approved by class, but no evidence indicated that accuracy of loading computer was tested by the attending surveyor during annual survey.

Chapter 9

• Ship side main deck chocks and bollard safe working load was less than the minimum breaking load of the mooring ropes being used on board. Working load of the ship side chocks and bollards was 64 tonnes. Mooring ropes minimum breaking load was 72 tonnes.

• SPM pick up hawser had to be lead through a pedestal roller at acute angle of 90 degrees to plumb the winch storage drum.

• The shipyards test records for mooring winch brakes indicated brake capacity is more than 255 KN (26 tons) and there was no mention of their rendering limits. The mooring ropes provided have an MBL of 51 tons (and current brake capacity value over MBL is about 50%).

• The rendering point was wrong marked as per the referenced points not match with control bars.

• Starboard anchor could not be released by hand as the cable was hard up against the locking bar. This was corrected during the inspection.

• Different size and material of the mooring ropes were deployed on board for mooring the vessel.

• The vessels aft spring lines (2 Nos.) led ashore for securing was observed with a half turn on the pedestal roller (weight on the roller pin not the brake).

• Vessel was provided with one bow chain stopper of SWL 200 MT. Bow chain stopper was not permanently marked with appropriate serial number.

• Brake lining of 2 poop deck rope drum had thinned down considerably and worn out at the edges.

Chapter 11

• (19) Nineteen pcs of the polycarbonate cover of lights were observed to be excessively cracked and some of the have hole in the Engine Room.

• Fuel oil leak off alarm for main engine was tested by disconnecting respective electrical terminals instead of physical movement of the float during this inspection. PMS on board did not specify procedure for testing the alarm.

• Risk due to water spray was apparent from a fire hydrant fitted at the bottom level of engine room which was located about 40 cm away from the Fire/GS/Ballast pump electrical motors.

• The vessel had carried out FO bunkering and the same bunkers had been used prior to receiving the analysis report.

• Notable oil leakage (about 30 litres whole bilge section), oily rags and temporary plastic drain drum (25lt) was observed from bilge well of main engine. Origin of the leakage could not establish.

• Emergency steering changeover procedures were not posted in the wheelhouse.

• The last lube oil analysis report for generator engine no 1 had an alert warning as the viscosity and the flash point are significantly lower than new oil value.

• ER workshop grinder guard was found cracked. This observation was corrected before The Vetting Inspector left the vessel.

• Exhaust temperature of no 5 unit was showing erroneous reading. Exhaust temperature of other main engine unit were 410 Deg whereas no 5-unit exhaust temperature was 352 Deg C.

• Total 4 light fittings in the steering gear room were noted with following observations: Three light covers faster were out of order; the covers were temporary lashed by wires. One light cover was damaged with about 15 cm crack.

Chapter 12

• The general condition of service pipework and associated fittings visual appearance was poor and most of the pipework observed rusty.

• The visible hull on the Starboard side had rust patches at sections normally in fender contact as well as where the anchor chain made contact with the hull. This item was not on the list of initial observation handed to the Master as the Inspector boarded at daybreak but the hull was better seen when disembarking from the vessel.

• The port side hull mid-ship draft marks and the load line marks were not visible as the contrasting paint had completely washed off.