Common CDI observations

Pay attention to recent CDI observations:

• Speed log: The ship speed log was indicating (-) 2.9 knot while berthed at the terminal that showed no apparent current. The speed log started showing lesser speed gradually coming to less than 1 knot towards the end of the inspection
• The current lloyds open form issued 2020 was not observed on board but lof 2011 was available on board.
• The vessel carried only electronic copies of worldwide security charts. There were no passage planning charts available on board.
• No evidence sighted that firmware and software was updated on the bridge.This does not include GMDSS and ECDIS. Excluding GMDSS and ECDIS no evidence sighted that all other firmware and software was being updated. - Please check your last service reports if upgrades have been recorded.
• Automatic Identification System (AIS): In view of a memory on the AIS, the AIS was switched off few times in 2020 year, but on/off time and reason why AIS was switched off was not recorded on the ship's log book. Also, dates of switched off were incorrectly being displayed on the AIS as 2000 year instead of 2020 year, and UN/LOCODE was not use for the input of destination port on the AIS.
• On the bridge is a list which indicates the equipment that is fed by the emergency generator but not which equipment is fed by the batteries.
• The Masters standing orders were not aligned to the Company procedures. The Sector reading was reduced to what the Company required.
• Maritime Security Charts were not available on board. The vessel had raised requisition amp; was awaiting supply.
• The interviewed officer could not indicate the correct sound signal for a ship NUC in restricted visibility.
• The navigation mate could not explain Collision Regulation 13b, the criteria when an other vessel was overtaking or coming in from the SB or port side.
• The navigation mate could not explain Collision Regulation 13b, the criteria when an other vessel was overtaking or coming in from the SB or port side.
• The interviewed officer could not explain why there is an X and S band radar on board.
• 2nd engineer (in charge of fixed fire detection system tests) was not familiar with the testing procedure for Flame detectors amp; Manual Call Points.
• The second mate was unable to produce the document "Status of T&P information in ENCs" published by the British Admiralty several times per year. Therefore he could not explain which countries did not include T&P notices with the weekly ENC updates and for which countries the T&P notices were included in AIO (Admiralty Information Overlay) or not.
• The spring lines aft make a U turn around the bullwark rollers between the winch and before leaving the ship.
• At the aft port middle winch the indicator to which point the brake should be tightened was missing.
• No record that a cross check was carried out by a 2nd individual on the cargo line-up prior to commencement of cargo transfer.
• There was no evidence that the safety relief valves for cargo liquid line and cargo vapor line were tested within the last 5 years.
• The ship ESD system cannot be linked to the shore. If the shore doesn’t want to connect then please record the same in Pre load/discharge information exchange.
• The C/O was not aware of the meaning and definition of TWA-TLV, specifically for how many hours this was. He didn't know the meaning of STEL. He was also not aware of the TLV for H2S.
• The enclosed space recuse drill was carried, as per the records the drill was carried in BWT, however there was no enclosed space permit checklist filled for this drill entrance.
• The one available portable resuscitator was stowed in the locked hospital. Hence, not readily available.
• No officer or engineer on board, had been trained to conduct incident and accident investigation. Master safety officer have incident investigation cert? if not carry out the CBT for the time being and insert cert printout in the persona folder.
• The UHF Radio's for firefighting were available on board, but their location was not indicated on the fire plans.
• Fire control plan in weathertight enclosure port side was found partly torn and taped.
• The pilot ladder could only be secured with two D-shackles to hard points above the main deck to choke the side ropes (ship's design). Shortening pilot ladders using the D-shackle method causes the weight of the ladder to be taken up by the D-shackle impacting directly against the mechanical securing clamps (widgets) which secure the ladders treads in place
• The engine room chemicals located in the store on the aft deck did not consider segregation of the 20 ltrs acid and alkali chemical drums.
• Review of crew work and rest hour in Jan. 2021 during this inspection revealed that the rest hour record of master and Chief engineer during vessel maneuvering on 15 Jan. 2021 from 0040 hours to 0130 hours was recorded as rest hour while Master was on conning on bridge and C/E was manned at E/R as per the record on the bell book. – Please ensure records match the log books/permits etc.